Who are the M23 Rebels in eastern DRC?

Instability in North Kivu, DRC, has significant impacts on the country’s political future

Originally published on Global Voices

Editor’s note: Since Jean Sovon first published this article on November 24, 2023, incumbent President Félix Tshisekedi was re-elected with 73 percent of the vote in the December 20, 2023 elections. The conflict has also worsened. In early 2025, M23 rebels launched new offensives, taking complete control of Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu, pushing the number of internally displaced persons above 7 million.

In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an armed group known as the March 23 Movement (M23) imposes its authority on local communities through violence, sexual assault, and terror. But what is the history behind this movement? And what impact did its offensives have on the December 2023 general elections?

What is the M23?

The M23 emerged from renewed tensions following the Kivu Conflict. This localized conflict in the eastern DRC, along the border with Rwanda, began in 2004. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) faced opposition from several armed groups. These groups included the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), founded in 2006 by the politician and Tutsi militia leader Laurent Nkunda. The DRC is a multi-ethnic country, and the Tutsis are an ethnic group primarily living in the Kivu region.

After five years of conflict, the DR Congolese state and the CNDP signed a peace agreement on March 23, 2009. Under the agreement, the rebel group agreed to transform into a political party in exchange for the release of its imprisoned members, improved living conditions for Tutsi communities, and three ministerial posts in government after the 2011 presidential election.

The DRC authorities’ failure to comply with the agreement terms led former CNDP rebels, who had integrated into the national Congolese army under the peace agreement, to revolt. In April 2012, they consequently formed the M23 to mark the agreement signing date, March 23, 2009. This TV5Monde report explains the origins of this movement:

The rebel movement thereby resumed its armed campaign. According to officials in Kinshasa, the DRC capital, both Rwanda and Uganda supported the M23. Both countries, however, denied any involvement. An anonymous DR Congolese officer, who was involved in the 2013 conflict, explained further in this article by online media outlet Afrique XXI:

Kigali niait, mais nous,au front, il nous arrivait de capturer des combattants rwandais ou des soldats du M23 qui étaient passés par le Rwanda, explique, sous le couvert de l’anonymat, un gradé congolais ayant pris part au conflit en 2013. Le message, c’était d’anéantir le M23, point! Il ne s’agissait absolument pas de mener la guerre jusqu’au Rwanda, même si, avec les informations qu’on avait, on savait parfaitement d’où et de qui venait cette guerre. Le Rwanda est dirigé par des Tutsi, le M23 est une mutinerie de soldats congolais tutsi, ils sont frères et parlent la même langue, ils avaient même souvent des liens familiaux au Rwanda.

Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, denied everything, but on the frontline, we would often capture Rwandan fighters or M23 soldiers who had passed through Rwanda. Our orders were to wipe out the M23, period! Although we knew perfectly well who was behind this war and where it came from, based on the information we had, taking the war to Rwanda was never our intention. Tutsis lead Rwanda, and the M23 is a mutiny of Congolese Tutsi soldiers. They are brothers who speak the same language and often have family connections in Rwanda. 

Four years after signing the peace agreement, the M23 rebellion appeared to end. Backed by UN peacekeepers, on November 5, 2013, the FARDC won a historic victory against M23 troops. Silenced, they fled to neighboring countries, such as Uganda and Rwanda.

This video provides a detailed overview of the FARDC victory:

M23 makes a comeback 

However, in March 2022, almost a decade after its defeat, the M23 made a military comeback. According to UN experts, with Rwanda’s ongoing support, the movement took up arms once again in the region, launching offensives against the DR Congolese army’s strategic positions. The motivation behind this resurgence remained unchanged: The DRC authorities’ failure to comply with the 2009 peace agreement.

On March 25, 2022, Bertrand Bisimwa, the current M23 leader, explained his desire to avoid another war on X:

Nous avons tout fait pour éviter une nouvelle guerre dans ce pays. Cependant le gouvernement congolais a fait ses choix. pic.twitter.com/LoKwZYSaPM

— Bertrand Bisimwa (@bbisimwa) March 25, 2022

We have done everything to avoid another war in this country. However, the DR Congolese government has made its choices. pic.twitter.com/LoKwZYSaPM

— Bertrand Bisimwa (@bbisimwa) March 25, 2022

The text in the picture reads:

The violence currently inflicted upon us by the Congolese army (FARDC) in the Rutshuru territory is a deliberate choice by the government. The state has chosen to wage war against citizens who surrendered unconditionally. We did this in response to the President’s appeal at the start of his term [DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s January 2019 inaguration address], calling on the country’s sons and daughters to unite and rebuild the nation.

In response, our organization sent several letters to the President of the Republic and the Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (MNS). In these documents, we offered our unconditional surrender and put ourselves at the Head of State’s service.

Subsequently, on our own initiative, we sent delegates to Kinshasa to speed up this surrender. Copies of these letters are attached to this press release:

1. Letter from January 26, 2019: Sent to the President, congratulating him on taking office. Our movement offered its full support, backing his national reconciliation program and helping bring peace to eastern DRC.
2. Explanatory Note from March 9, 2019: Sent to the President regarding the peace process stemming from the Nairobi Declarations of December 12, 2013.
3. Letter from June 15, 2019: Sent to the newly appointed Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (MNS), Mr. Claude Ibalanky Ekolomba, requesting updates on the 2013 peace declarations signed between the DRC government and the M23.
4. Letter from July 12, 2019: Sent to the Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (MNS), expressing our full support for the 2017 Brazzaville regional agreement, specifically regarding plans to return M23 fighters home unconditionally.
5. Letter from September 21, 2020: Sent to the President to once again confirm ou surrender and verify that all M23 political and military personnel were following his orders.
6. Mission Order from September 30, 2020: After receiving no response to our letters, our movement sent a delegation to Kinshasa to speed up the surrender process. Our delegates remained in Kinshasa for 14 months. They held multiple working sessions with state authorities, who eventually told them to return to their base and wait for the surrender operations to begin. Much to our surprise, just two weeks later, the FARDC launched an offensive, putting our fighters on the defensive.
7. Official Record from October 24, 2020: Documenting the formal recognition of the General Staff of the Congolese Revolutionary Army.
8. Letter from February 12, 2021: Following the Kinshasa meetings, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Mr. Gilbert Kankonde, wrote to the President, informing him of a complete M23 stand-down. He requested funds to execute the disarmament operation, but to no avail.

The military operations that the national army has launched against our fighters clearly show that the government has chosen to fight the M23 rather than accept our unconditional surrender.

Our organization has been tirelessly awaiting the implementation of the peace process for nine years. We deeply deplore this choice of violence, whose hidden objective is to maintain instability and underdevelopment in eastern DRC.

Signed in Sarambwe on March 25, 2022

By the March 23 Movement

Willy NGOMA

Spokesperson for the Congolese Revolutionary Army

Interviewed by TV5Monde in April 2022, Pierre Boisselet, Violence Research Director at Ebuteli, a Congolese research institute, elaborated further on the M23 comeback:

Far from weakened, the M23 gained territory and expanded its influence in North Kivu a year after the renewed hostilities. This was a major setback for the Kinshasa government, which sought to regain and secure these territories ahead of the upcoming general elections.

Instability risks during elections

In late December 2023, as the DRC prepared to hold its general elections, the electoral roll revision process went smoothly throughout the country. However, voter enrollment was extremely challenging in the east, prompting some political figures and civil society organizations to request an extension in these areas.

During the electoral process, the M23 comeback had a major impact, including increasing insecurity in the province with the second-largest voter count.

Forced to flee, the number of internally displaced persons continues to increase in the DRC. Quoted in a TV5Monde article on November 19, 2023, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported:

La reprise des combats début octobre a déjà fait plus de 450 000 déplacés supplémentaire. Les provinces du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu et de l’Ituri abritent à elles seules plus de 5,5 millions de personnes déplacées.

The renewed hostilities, beginning in October, have already displaced an additional 450,000 people. The North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces alone host more than 5.5 million displaced persons.

In addition to the M23, other rebel groups also operate in the same region. These include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a predominantly Muslim group affiliated with the Islamic State, which often attacks civilians. Another is the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), a group committed to protecting the Lendu community from the Hema ethnic group and FARDC in the northeastern Ituri Province. Lastly is the rebel branch of the Burundian National Forces of Liberation (FNL), based in the Mwenga Territory, South Kivu Province.

These groups, therefore, pose a security challenge for the Kinshasa government, which has yet to find a solution to the M23 rebellion.

The general elections on December 20, 2023, were ultimately held amid high tensions and escalating violence throughout the region. According to Bob Kabamba, Professor of Political Sciences at the University of Liège, the risk of spillover effects was not limited to the DRC’s borders. In a TV5Monde interview, he warned:

Il faut souligner l’inquiétude de toute la région : l’est de la RDC, l’Afrique centrale, la Communauté de développement d'Afrique australe… tous tirent la sonnette d’alarme sur la situation au Congo, sur la persistance d’une insécurité qui pourrait impacter d’autres pays comme le Congo Brazzaville, la République centrafricaine et le Sud Soudan si le Congo se trouvait déstabilisé.

We must highlight the concerns felt across the region. For eastern DRC, Central Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), alarm bells are ringing about the situation in the Congo and its ongoing insecurity. If the Congo were to become destabilized, this could ultimately impact other countries, such as Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.